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Effects of Technology Transfer Policies on the Technical 
Efficiency of Korean University TTOs 
By JAEPIL HAN* 
 
The Korean government has provided various policy devices to boost 
technology transfers between academia and industry since the 
establishment of the Technology Transfer Promotion Act in 2000. Along 
with the enactment of the law, the Korean government mandated the 
establishment of a technology transfer office at national and public 
universities and encouraged technology transfer activities. Despite the 
quantitative expansion of technology transfer offices (TTOs), operational 
inefficiency was brought up. As a supplementary policy, the Korean 
government implemented a line of projects to support the labor and 
business expenses of leading TTOs. This research questions whether 
the project greatly affected the technical efficiency of TTOs. We 
analyze publicly available university panel data from 2007 to 2015 
using a one-step stochastic frontier analysis. The results suggest that the 
program was marginally effective at shifting the technical efficiency 
distribution to the right on average, but it failed to maximize its impact 
by diversifying the policy means based on targets. The marginal effects 
of the program on technical efficiency differ according to the research 
capability and size of each school. We also compare technical efficiency 
against the licensing income at the start and end of the program. 
Technical efficiency increased for the leading TTOs, and both measures 
show improvements for unsupported TTOs. Our empirical results 
imply that diversifying the program for universities with different 
characteristics may have improved the effectiveness of the policy. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
he assessment that the Bayh–Dole Act positively affected the commercialization 
of publicly funded research has led to the implementation of similar policies in 
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many countries. A few policies focus on legal reformations related to the 
ownership of intellectual property rights produced by publicly funded research to 
facilitate commercialization. Another set of policies concerns the establishment or 
fostering of intermediaries for the technology transfer functions of universities. 
Several researchers were critical of these policies and skeptical about their 
effectiveness. Mowery and Sampat (2005) argued that the success of Bayh–Dole is 
actually due to universities' efforts to engage in university-industry collaboration 
and technology transfers even before the enactment of the law and that these efforts 
are rooted in the scale and structure of the U.S. higher education system. They 
predicted that such efforts to emulate the Bayh–Dole policy will not achieve great 
success. Indeed, industry–academia cooperation in Western European countries, 
Japan, and Korea still tends to be led by the respective governments, and an 
atmosphere of autonomous cooperation with the private sector is not easily formed. 
Nonetheless, due to the increasing complexity and diversity of technological 
advances, voluntary activities for knowledge spillover by the private sector are 
required, and governments continue to make efforts to create ecosystems in which 
such activities can thrive. In countries without a lengthy history of university–
industry collaboration, such as the United States, various policy interventions have 
attempted to achieve smooth transfers of public research outcomes. The Korean 
government's technology transfer policies have also been part of the efforts. The 
Korean government has provided various policy devices to boost technology 
transfers between academia and industry since the establishment of the Technology 
Transfer Promotion Act (TTPA) in 2000 and the Industrial Education Enhancement 
and Industry-Academia Research Cooperation Promotion Act in 2003.1 
Despite the efforts of the Korean Government, university—industry cooperation 
is not considered active. In particular, technology transfer offices (TTO), which are 
responsible for patents, licensing, and commercialization, are still judged to lack 
expertise and competence, despite the fact that they are legally required to be 
established.2 As the government led the establishment of TTOs at national and 
public universities, the expansion of university TTOs has been more quantitative 
within a short period. However, TTOs suffered from operational inefficiency 
because most of them did not have enough experience and/or specialists such as 
patent attorneys and technology valuation specialists. These problems are not 
 
1In Korea, several laws were enacted or revised by benchmarking the Bayh–Dole act. Three representative 
acts are the Technology Transfer Promotion Act (enacted in 2000), the Industry Education Enhancement and 
Industry—Academia—Research Cooperation Promotion Act (amended in 2003; IARC Promotion Act hereafter), 
and the Invention Promotion Act (amended in 2006). The enactment of TTPA made it possible to manage 
intellectual property through TTOs, but this law encompasses not only universities but also the TTOs of 
government research institutions. Meanwhile, the amendment of the IARC Promotion Act in 2003 made it 
possible for the Industry-Academia Cooperation Foundation to acquire legal status and handle integrated issues 
such as intellectual property rights management, affairs of technology transfers, and researcher compensation. The 
amendment of the Invention Promotion Act in 2006 allowed teaching staff of a national or public school to have a 
non-exclusive license for employee invention. Accordingly, detailed policy devices related to the laws originated 
from the spirit of the Bayh–Dole act, and some of the policy programs implemented according to each law may 
resemble each other. For example, the Leaders in Industry-University Cooperation + (LINC+) project is similar to 
but more comprehensive than the Leading TTO Cultivation Project. In this paper, we focus on the policy effects of 
the Leading TTO Cultivation Project and our results are therefore limited in that we cannot address all of the 
complicated relationships between policies. 
2On the basis of TTPA, the government mandated the establishment of technology transfer offices (TTOs) at 
national and public universities and encouraged technology transfer activities. 
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easily solved because the corresponding universities have not provided sufficient 
funding for the operation of the TTOs. The government recognized the structural 
problems and attempted to enhance the capabilities of TTOs through 
supplementary financial support. For this reason, starting in 2006 the government 
began to implement the financial support project known as the Leading TTO 
Cultivation Project to subsidize the labor and business expenses of TTOs which 
have shown relatively high performance capabilities.  
At the moment when the Leading TTO Cultivation Project, which was originally 
planned for five years, was extended for another five years, the TTOs of Korean 
universities were evaluated to have better competence in terms of the number of 
experts, technology transfer income, and patent registrations. However, it is not 
known how much of the improvement is due to the policy. The purpose of this 
paper is quantitatively to evaluate the effects of the policy and present future policy 
directions. 
Technology transfer is a topic studied from a wide variety of aspects. Bozeman 
(2000) and Bozeman et al. (2015) found several major directions in the broader 
technology transfer literature under the dimensions of the contingent effectiveness 
model. In particular, Bozeman et al. (2015) found that the discussion of recent 
studies is centered on university settings. While many studies focus on the impact 
and effectiveness of technology transfers, factors affecting the effectiveness of 
technology transfers are still being explored (Caldera and Debande, 2010). As 
technology transfers involve many actors and the final outputs of TTOs vary 
according to the institutional goal, various determinants are being studied. 
Although the output of TTOs is not singular but rather mixed, the number of 
technology transfers, royalty income, and licensing fees are recognized as the main 
outputs (Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Carlsson and Fridh, 2002; Siegel et al., 2007). 
Often, intellectual property rights ownership, start-ups, or spin-offs based on 
technologies invented in university labs are considered to be the outputs of TTOs 
(Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Carlsson and Fridh, 2002; Friedman and Silberman, 
2003). 
A large portion of the studies on technology transfers focus on finding the 
determinants of technology transfers, and many factors have been explored in 
different countries. Listing each factor is difficult because previous studies identify 
many determinants of a technology transfer. One of the reasons for the various and 
complicated determinants is that technology transfers are complex activities that 
involve multiple stages. Defining a typical production function as one for the 
manufacturing sector is challenging. Various determinants can be categorized as the 
primary inputs for invention, secondary inputs for technology transfers, and other 
environmental factors. Interestingly, the outputs from technology production are 
actually the important intermediate inputs for the stage of the technology transfer. 
Another portion of studies attempts to estimate the production function and 
productivity of technology transfer units, which are TTOs in most cases (Siegel et al., 
2003; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Thursby and Thursby, 2002). These studies seek 
to find the determinants of the improved technical efficiency of technology transfer 
units. 
Several countries have implemented technology transfer policies under 
government initiatives, but few empirical studies have examined how these policies 
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affect technology transfers. Goldfarb and Henrekson (2003) showed that policy 
efficiency can change according to the policy delivery structure by comparing 
cases in Sweden and the United States. In particular, they argued that the top-down 
nature of Swedish policies may be an obstacle to the commercialization of 
academic achievements, whereas competition between universities and researchers 
for research funding has allowed academics to interact with industry actively. The 
lack of empirical research on the effectiveness of policies may be due to the failure 
to find a policy environment that influences technology transfers independently in 
many countries. A major contribution of the present study lies in identifying the 
policy environment and conducting an empirical analysis to confirm the 
effectiveness of a policy. 
In this study, we analyze the effects of the Leading TTO Cultivation Project 
implemented by the Korean government from 2011 to 2015 on the technical 
efficiency of university TTOs. In particular, we utilize a one-step stochastic 
frontier analysis with publicly available university panel data of Korea from 2007 
to 2015. The main finding is that the TTO policy effectively improved the technical 
efficiency of university TTOs on the average, whereas the effects of the policy 
could be improved if it were fine-tuned according to the characteristics of the 
TTOs and universities. 
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. In the next section, 
we introduce the technology transfer policy in Korea and the financial support 
program for TTOs, which is the main policy instrument analyzed in section III. In 
section III, we analyze the impacts of the TTO support program by using a one-
step stochastic frontier analysis. We review the one-step stochastic frontier model 
suggested by Wang and Schmidt (2002), and illustrate the results from an empirical 
analysis. Finally, section IV concludes the paper. 
 
II. Technology Transfer Policy in Korea 
 
To facilitate exchanges of knowledge and technology between science and 
technology academia and industry, the Korean government has enacted laws and 
implemented various plans and support projects accordingly. Korea had 
emphasized linkages between industry and academia during the process of 
industrialization in the 1960s, but only in a few cases were the research outcomes 
of public research institutes (PRIs) transferred or put into practical use by the end 
of the 1990s. The TTPA was enacted in 2000 to promote the development of 
science and technology and the commercialization of achievements in these areas. 
The Science and Technology Innovation Office3 began to manage and utilize 
research results with government support starting in 2005. In 2006, the TTPA was 
amended to increase the incentives for the technology commercialization of PRIs. 
In addition, the Korean government has enacted various laws for the protection of 
intellectual property rights, the promotion of university–industry collaboration, 
 
3The Science and Technology Innovation Office is a subordinate organization of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology. It is responsible for the coordination of the related departments of S&T policies, industry, manpower, 
and regional innovation policies, along with the allocation of the R&D budget and performance evaluations. 
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support for the development of new technology, the creation of a proper ecosystem, 
and participation by private companies. 
Along with such legal assistance, the Technology Transfer and Commercialization 
Plan (TTCP) was implemented in 2001. The plan aims to integrate the management 
of the details of various ministries involved in technology transfer and 
commercialization activities. At the beginning, the plan focused on building 
infrastructures (e.g., the technology trading market, National Technology Bank) 
and establishing intermediary organizations such as an industry–academia 
cooperation foundation, TTOs, and technology evaluation institutions. In the 
second phase of the plan, the emphasis was on building a system for technologically 
innovative businesses by allowing technology in-kind contributions and expanding 
technology finance. Owing to these efforts, social awareness of technology 
transfers and commercialization spread in a short period and a quantitative 
expansion was possible. However, the lack of links between detailed projects and a 
policy that prioritizes quantitative achievements were obstacles to smooth 
collaboration between researchers and industry. To solve these problems, the plan 
focused on establishing a technology-oriented ecosystem and encouraging voluntary 
participation by the private sector. To this end, the role of the technology transfer 
intermediaries has been to attract attention, and the organizational expertise of TTO 
has been incorporated into the detailed goals of the plan since 2012. 
The Korean government's technology transfer policy has expanded quantitatively 
with the TTCP, but these efforts have generally resulted in projects targeting 
SMEs. Relatively little attention has been paid to universities, even if policy 
programs that qualify for universities and their subordinate organizations actually 
require company participation or are intended to help SMEs that are technology 
consumers. In other words, only few policies have attempted to solve the problems 
of university TTOs on the side of the technology provider. Technology transfer 
policies have been centered on enterprises because policy authorities took the 
existence of intermediary organizations for granted and did not recognize that the 
intermediaries had not been developed sufficiently. 
The Leading TTO Cultivation Project is one of the few policies aimed at 
university TTOs. The project was actually initiated by the Small and Medium 
Business Administration in 2001 and continued on a very small scale until 2006. In 
2006, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy and the Ministry of Education, 
Science, and Technology expanded this project and started a new project called 
Connect Korea, benchmarking the CONNECT program of the University of 
California, San Diego (UCSD). The project was planned as a five-year project, 
three years to complete the first half and two years for the second half, and 18 
universities and their TTOs were supported by the project. At its beginning, TTOs 
were still being established in many universities, implying that this project 
contributed to the spreading of TTOs throughout the country and to expanding 
professional employment (Table 1) rather than contributing to the actual growth of 
the TTOs. 
In 2010, when the project ended, Korean universities were still in a poor 
situation. TTOs are operated as subordinate organizations of the University–
Industry Collaboration Foundation, which is responsible for more complex tasks. 
Hence, concentrating on technology transfers was difficult, and only four or five  
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TABLE 1—PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN TTOS AFTER THE CONNECT KOREA PROGRAM 
Year 
Specialists 
Non-specialists Total 
PA1 TTA2 CVA3 
2006 - - - 72 72 
2007 7 8 - 99 114 
2008 8 19 15 73 115 
2009 10 26 23 103 162 
2010 17 27 41 88 173 
Note: 1) 1Patent Attorneys; 2Technology Transfer Agents; 3Certified Valuation Analysts, 2) Figures are the workforce 
of 18 universities which participated in the Connect Korea program. The Connect Korea program ran from 2001 
to 2005. 
 
staff members were involved. Although the number of experts increased, this was 
limited to universities with the proper financial leeway. 
After the end of the project, the government expanded its scale and implemented 
a new project termed the Leading TTO Cultivation Project from 2011 onwards. A 
major difference from the previous support project is that TTOs with superior 
performance capabilities are prioritized while second-best TTO groups are 
supported by a type of consortium. TTOs are divided into two types according to 
their existing technology transfer performances and their capacities. At the time of 
the project in 2011, leading TTOs received KRW 150 million to KRW 300 million, 
and the TTOs of the consortium received KRW 50 million. This project was also 
planned as a five-year project, with two years allocated for the first half and three 
years for the second half. In total, 24 TTOs were supported in the first half of the 
project and 30 TTOs were supported in the second half. The subsidies were 
designated to be used to cover labor costs, technology discovery, evaluations, and 
marketing. The project also provided educational programs for technology 
transfers, but this was not the main part. Essentially, the project was a simple 
program to support the operating expenses of TTOs.  
In the next section, we examine the impact of the Leading TTO Cultivation 
Project on efficiency improvements at TTOs through an empirical analysis. 
 
III. Impacts of a Financial Support Program 
 
A. One-step Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
 
The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and the data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
methods are widely used methodologies which analyze how efficient decision-
making units are. The SFA is based on the idea that no economic unit can exceed a 
theoretical production frontier; therefore, the degree of inefficiency can be 
estimated by the gap between the ideal production frontier and the productivity of 
each economic unit. The main goal of the conventional SFA is an empirical 
estimation of the relative inefficiency (or efficiency) of individual economic units 
compared to the best practice unit. 
A simple stochastic frontier model can be written as follows:  
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Eq. (1) is a log-transformation of a Cobb–Douglas production function. The 
empirical literature on the production function generally seeks to estimate the 
parameters of the production function that passes through the middle of data points. 
Arguments in the stochastic frontier literature redirected attention from the 
production function to deviations from that function (Greene, 2008). Generally, 
SFA focuses on estimations of the deviation from the production frontier with the 
assumption that the error term includes unobserved productivity, which is additive 
to the white noise. The error term it  can then be decomposed into the 
unobservable inefficiency term itu  and white noise itv . If an economic unit, for 
instance i m , is producing on the production frontier, then its inefficiency is 
zero by definition; i.e., 0mtu  , whereas the inefficiencies of other economic units 
are greater than zero; i.e., 0itu  , where i m . In other words, a one-sided 
distribution can be assumed for the inefficiency term itu . Under this assumption, 
the relative inefficiency is comparable by estimating the inefficiency distribution 
and parameters of the production function using, in this case, Eq. (1). 
Although efficiency4 is essentially unobservable, we can think of the sources of 
efficiency. The early literature on the sources of efficiency constructed what was 
termed an efficiency equation using the estimated efficiency measure shown in Eq. 
(1) as a dependent variable, estimating it separately. These studies, using what is 
known as the two-step approach, consider efficiency factors exogenous to the 
independent variables of Eq. (1). 
However, the endogeneity issue is prevalent as long as we cannot control the 
relevant variables precisely, and the estimates are biased when we ignore the 
endogeneity problem. For this reason, a set of studies after Kumbhakar et al. 
(1991) stressed the usefulness of the one-step approach, which estimates the system 
of the production function and the efficiency equation at the same time. In 
particular, Wang (2002) and Wang and Schmidt (2002) showed that estimates from 
two-step approach can be biased, with the following reasoning. First, there is a 
possibility of a correlation between the explanatory variables for the production 
function and the determinants for the efficiency equation. Second, it is challenging 
to exclude the possibility that omitted variables exist in the efficiency model used 
in the second step. Third, it is highly probable that the estimated efficiency in the 
first step without considering the determinants of efficiency is downwardly biased. 
A simple means of introducing influences in the inefficiency model is to 
consider the location and scale of the distribution. Studies such as those by 
Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Huang and Liu (1994), and Battese and Coelli (1995) 
proposed the parametrization of the mean of the pre-truncated inefficiency 
distribution. As an extension, Caudill and Ford (1993) and Caudill et al. (1995) put 
 
4The relative inefficiency term can be transformed into the relative efficiency measure through a negative 
exponential function. Hence, efficiency and inefficiency terms are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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forward the parameterization of the mean and variance of the pre-truncated 
inefficiency distribution to allow heteroscedasticity in itu  and/or itv . 
Additionally, Wang (2002) introduced a methodology to allow non-monotonic 
efficiency effects owing to the possibility that the effects of determinants on the 
efficiency distribution are not monotonic. For example, the accumulation of 
experience by farmers can enhance production efficiency even if the marginal 
effect of age on efficiency is negative.  
In the present study, we apply the methodology suggested by Wang (2002) to 
estimate the marginal effects of policy intervention on the technical efficiency of 
university technology transfer offices. The main model is expressed in the 
following system of equations, 
 
(2)        it it ity x    , 
(3)        it it itv u   , 
(4)        2~ (0, )it vv N  , 
(5)        2~ ( , )it it itu N   , 
(6)        it itz  , 
(7)        2 exp( )it itz  , 
 
where itz  denotes the vector of the determinants of inefficiency. As noted 
above, Eq. (2) represents a log-transformed production function, and Eq. (3) is the 
composed error of the inefficiency and white noise. We assume that the white noise 
follows a normal distribution with zero mean and variance of 2v . Inefficiency, itu , 
is assumed to have a truncated normal distribution, 5  whose pre-truncated 
distribution has a mean of it  and variance of 2it . Following Wang (2002), we 
parametrize both the mean and variance of the pre-truncated efficiency distribution, 
as expressed in Eq. (6) and Eq. (7). 
Given that it  and 2it  represent the mean and variance of the pre-truncated 
distribution, respectively,   and   are not precise measures of the effects of 
itz  on the efficiency distribution. Instead, Wang (2002) provided the functional 
form of the marginal effects of each determinant on the location of the efficiency 
distribution, as follows6: 
 
(8) 
2 2
2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 1 [ ] (1 )
[ ] ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
it itE u k k
z k
                                                       
 
 
5A one-sided distribution of inefficiency can be modeled in various ways. The widely used distributional 
forms are the truncated normal, half normal, exponential, and gamma distribution. 
6Wang (2002) also provided the functional form of the marginal effects of determinant on the variance of 
efficiency. We do not present the functional form here, as our main interest is on the location rather than the 
dispersion of the efficiency distribution. 
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Here, [ ]z k  denotes the k th element of the determinants, /it it   , and   
and   represent the probability density function and cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal, respectively. 
 
B. Data Description 
 
The data sources of this paper are three fold. The primary data source is the 
Information Service of Higher Education (ISHE) in Korea. It provides publicly 
available information and regulated relevant details of all universities in Korea. 
The variables we collected from this source include operational details of the office 
of research affairs, research activities and funding, and general information 
pertaining to universities. We also collect the number of patents owned by each 
university from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the 
European Patent Office and the Korea Institute of Patent Information (KIPI). 
Finally, we obtain information about the recipients of government financial support 
programs from business description materials held by the Ministry of Science, ICT, 
and Future Planning (MSIP) and the Ministry of Education (MOE). 
The number of technology transfers and royalty income are collected on the 
basis of the information reported by the university–industry cooperation 
foundations based on the contracts for technology transfers. In this case, 
technology transfers are limited to cases in which the developed technology is 
purchased or licensed, and transfers of technology that has not been developed, 
such as technical consultations, industrial joint research, and personnel exchanges, 
are excluded. Royalty income refers to the amount of money actually deposited in 
the survey year, regardless of the contract year, excluding VAT, and the number of 
contracts means the number of contracts for technology transfers made in the 
survey year. The operating expenses for university–industry cooperation were 
collected based on closed accounts data. This variable refers to expenditures on 
operating expenses for industry-academia cooperation among the accounting 
categories of the Industry-Academia Collaboration Foundation. This item is 
composed of industry-academy cooperation research funds, educational 
administration fees, intellectual property rights operation and transfer fees, school 
facility fees, industry-university cooperation rewards, and other industry-academic 
cooperation fees.7 Next, research funds include only cash in the amounts agreed 
upon during the base year. Among these, the amounts for government subsidies are 
research funds supported by the central government and ministries and not local 
governments. Total financial support means grants through financial support 
projects. A financial support project refers to a project that is managed through an 
on-campus institution and that meets one of the following conditions: improvement 
of educational conditions, development and operation of the curriculum, 
improvement of the undergraduate system, cooperation between industry and 
academia, and research and development by professors and students. 
The range of data is nine years, from 2007 to 2015 inclusive. The number of  
 
7 The operating expenses for university–industry cooperation do not include remuneration for TTO 
employees. Therefore, there is no problem with duplicated calculations between the number of TTO staff members 
and labor costs in the selection of input factors. 
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TABLE 2—SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Classification Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
TTO 
Operational 
Details 
No. of Technology Transfers 1,039 17.8 21.6 0 141 
Royalty Income 885 430.9 727.7 0.3 7,065 
No. of TTO Staff Members 976 3.5 3.5 0 25.8 
Operating Expenses 927 7 18.8 0 335 
Research 
Activities 
Total Research Funding 1,110 33.3 58.9 0 502 
Gov’t Research Funding 1,110 25.4 48.5 0 450 
Private Research Funding 1,110 4.3 9.0 0 66 
Local Research Funding 1,110 1.3 1.7 0 12 
General 
Information 
Total Financial Support 1,068 57.1 1,000 0 32,800 
No. of Students (Thousands) 937 13.2 8.3 0 39.5 
No. of Faculty Members 1,110 455 340 15 2,248 
Total Education Expenses 937 168 164 0 1,220 
IPR 
Domestic Patents Granted 1,102 257.5 590.7 0 7,080 
Foreign Patents Granted 1,102 29.2 108.5 0 1,086 
Note: The data source for TTO Operational Details, Research Activities, and General Information is ISHE. 
Domestic and Foreign Patents are from KIPI and EPO PATSTAT, respectively. All monetary variables are in 
KRW. Units of Operating Expenses, Total Research Funding, Government / Private / Local Research Funding, 
Total Financial Support, and Total Education Expenses are in billions of KRW and Royalty Income is in millions 
of KRW in this table. 
  
institutions of higher education in Korea has gradually increased.8 Such institutions 
exist in various forms and pursue different purposes. Some do not aim to transfer 
technology, or this activity is impossible because they do not have technologies to 
sell. Therefore, we limit the sample to universities that are capable of technology 
transfers. We exclude universities that did not have technology transfer revenue for 
the sample period. In addition, universities within the lower 10% in terms of 
average royalty income for the three years between 2013 and 2015 inclusive are 
excluded. The final sample collected on this basis is an unbalanced panel with 127 
observations per year. All nominal variables are adjusted to real variables with a 
GDP deflator for 2010. The summary statistics are displayed in Table 2, and the 
correlation coefficients between the variables are given in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. 
 
C. Empirical Results 
 
As we have discussed in Section I, there is only a rough consensus on the 
outputs and inputs of the TTOs' production function. Although TTOs aim to 
support researchers' patent activities and ultimately to increase the number of 
patents owned by universities, it is also an important operational goal to increase 
technology transfer income by selling patents already owned. For this reason, one 
may regard patents as a part of the outcome that TTOs produce. However, the 
 
8There were 408 institutions of higher education in 2007, and this number increased to 431 in 2015. 
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contributions of TTOs during this process are not research activities for patent 
production but rather overall an auxiliary role for the registration and management 
of IP. Naturally, we consider IP as an intermediate input for TTOs to create 
technology transfer outcomes. In this study, we assume that the intellectual 
property rights of each university are intermediate inputs that can be utilized by 
TTOs.  
To sum up, the number of technology transfer contracts and the amounts of 
royalty income are considered as outputs, and inputs consist of operating expenses 
of TTOs, the number of TTO employees and the cumulative numbers of domestic 
and foreign patents owned by the affiliate university. The other variables include a 
policy dummy and control variables describing the university research 
environments. The policy dummy indicates a value of 1 for all years i in which the 
TTO policy subsidizes university j, and 0 otherwise. The control variables for 
university research environments include the size of the university as measured by 
the funding amount, the number of faculty members, the number of students, or 
total education expenses, the size of the TTO proxied by operating expenses, and 
other variables to control for the general characteristics of universities, such as the 
location of the university or whether a university is private or public.  
With these variables, we estimated the system of equations, Eq. (2) to Eq. (7), by 
means of maximum likelihood estimations, as in Battese and Coelli (1995). All 
variables but dummy variables are logarithmic, and lagged values of the TTO 
policy dummy, operating expenses, are used. Because there is a possibility of a 
sample selection problem with regard to the TTO policy dummy, we used the 
estimated inverse Mill’s ratio from a probit model9 for the TTO policy dummy.  
Table 3 illustrates the parameter estimates. Table 3 consists of the estimation 
results of Frontier Equation Eq. (2) and Inefficiency Equation Eq. (5). The table 
shows the results from seven specifications. We keep the input variables for the 
Frontier Equation unchanged, whereas the specification for the Inefficiency 
Equation varies. We take logarithm of the output and input variables; therefore, the 
estimated coefficients for the Frontier Equation can be interpreted as the output 
elasticities of each input factor. We assume that there is no exogenous variable that 
affects the efficiency of the TTO operation in specification (1), which is our 
baseline model. In this case, the output elasticities of all variables but operating 
expenses are significant and positive. The output elasticity of domestic patents 
granted is the largest, whereas that of foreign patents granted is the smallest. The 
coefficient estimates of the Frontier Equation are stable across specifications; 
therefore, the estimation of the Frontier Equation is robust for this model.  
We set it  as a function of the TTO policy in specification (2). The magnitudes 
of the coefficient estimates of the Frontier Equation do not change much, and the 
coefficient for operating expenses is estimated to be positive and significant. The 
result revealed that the effect of the TTO policy on the mean of the inefficiency 
distribution is negative but statistically insignificant. For specifications (1) and (2), 
the constant term is estimated as negative but insignificant. This implies that 
inefficiencies are likely to be distributed near zero, which is ideal but unrealistic. In 
 
9The determinants of the probit model are total research funding, the number of TTO staff members, domestic 
and foreign patent amounts, operational expenses, total financial support, and the number of faculty members. 
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TABLE 3—PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR ONE-STEP SFA MODELS 
Dep. Var. Royalty Income (logged) 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Frontier Equation 
Operating Expenses 0.024 0.027* 0.025 0.025 0.041** 0.025 0.024 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) 
TTO employment 0.334*** 0.260*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.249*** 0.252*** 0.257*** 
 (0.071) (0.059) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048) (0.046) (0.047) 
Domestic Patents 0.537*** 0.526*** 0.470*** 0.469*** 0.433*** 0.446*** 0.423*** 
 (0.049) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) 
Foreign Patents 0.179*** 0.146*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.151*** 
 (0.043) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
Constant 9.033*** 9.179*** 9.596*** 9.602*** 9.641*** 9.802*** 9.888*** 
 (0.289) (0.269) (0.269) (0.273) (0.304) (0.282) (0.285) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inefficiency Equation 
Mu        
TTO Policy (t-1)  -11.672 -4.797* -4.786* -3.234* -3.272* -2.861* 
  (7.161) (2.746) (2.744) (1.872) (1.901) (1.722) 
Faculty   -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Public Univ.    -0.059 0.441 0.334 0.376 
    (0.552) (0.468) (0.464) (0.436) 
Gov’t R&D      -0.530*   
     (0.281)   
Private R&D     -0.057   
     (0.185)   
Local R&D     -0.013   
     (0.164)   
Total R&D      -0.529***  
      (0.201)  
Total Financial 
Support 
      -0.844*** 
      (0.233) 
Constant -9.690 -3.919 1.237* 1.317 9.773*** 9.146*** 14.266*** 
 (10.676) (3.126) (0.724) (1.004) (2.919) (2.782) (3.311) 
Usigma        
Constant 2.354*** 1.839*** 1.260*** 1.259*** 0.998*** 0.993*** 0.910*** 
 (0.868) (0.468) (0.294) (0.295) (0.252) (0.264) (0.222) 
Vsigma        
Constant -1.242*** -1.437*** -1.632*** -1.633*** -1.731*** -1.743*** -1.775*** 
 (0.230) (0.248) (0.248) (0.247) (0.262) (0.259) (0.255) 
Obs. 741 741 741 741 715 741 728 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -1,011.97 -990.42 -961.96 -961.95 -923.58 -954.94 -925.22 
Note: 1) Numbers in parentheses are Huber-White Robust Standard Errors, 2) *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
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specification (3), we added the number of faculty members, which is a proxy for 
research capacity, as a determinant of inefficiency. Along with the TTO policy 
variable, the number of professors has a negative and significant effect on the mean 
of the inefficiency distribution. In other words, the efficiency of TTO improves 
distributionally as the number of professors increases or if a TTO is supported by a 
governmental financial support policy.  
In specification (4), we added a public dummy that indicates whether the 
universities to which a TTO belongs are public or private. Given that the estimates 
from this specification are comparable to those from specification (3) and the 
coefficient estimate of the public dummy is insignificant, it can be concluded that 
the university type does not affect the efficiency of the TTO.  
Specifications (5)-(7) include two funding variables as inefficiency determinants: 
Research Funding from various sources and Total Financial Support. When 
research funding for each source is included in (5), only government research 
funding reduces inefficiency significantly. The magnitude of the impact of 
government research funding in (5) is comparable to that of total research funding 
in (6). This is reasonable considering that nearly 71% of total research funding 
comes from the government for universities in Korea. The results from 
specifications (6) and (7) indicate that either total research funding or total 
financial support improves the efficiency of TTOs. 
Because specifications (1)-(4) are nested into specification (5), we perform likelihood 
ratio tests on the hypotheses that nested models are preferred in specification (5). 
The results suggest that specifications (1)-(4) are rejected in favor of specification 
(5) at the 5% level. 
It should be noted that the estimates displayed in Table 3 are not the marginal 
effects of determinants on the mean of the inefficiency distribution, ( )itE u  
despite the fact that the signs coincide. In Eq. (6), it  is not the mean of 
inefficiency; rather, it is the mean of the pre-truncation of the inefficiency 
distribution because we assume that the distribution of inefficiency takes a half-
normal form. The marginal effects of determinants on the mean of the inefficiency 
distribution can be expressed by Eq. (8) from Wang (2002). The marginal effects 
can be derived for each of the observations. 
In Table 4, the sample mean of the marginal effects are listed. The negative sign 
of the estimated marginal effect means that the inefficiency is alleviated on average 
as the corresponding determinants become larger. One can find that all but the 
public university dummy have negative marginal effects on mean inefficiency. In 
addition, the TTO policy has the greatest marginal effects, indicating that the TTO 
policy played an important role in reducing the operational inefficiency of TTOs on 
average. 
Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the observation-wise marginal effects of the inefficiency 
determinants. The horizontal axis represents the determinant and the vertical axis is 
the marginal effect. Figure 1 is generated from specification (5), as is shows the 
largest log-pseudolikelihood.10 First, Panel (a) shows the differences in the marginal 
 
10Note that the observation-wise marginal effects of the TTO policy and faculty size are estimated to be 
similar in all specifications. This can be inferred by the comparable coefficient estimates in Table 3 and Table 4. 
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TABLE 4—MARGINAL EFFECTS OF INEFFICIENCY DETERMINANTS ON ( )itE u  
Specifications (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TTO Policy (t-1) -1.517 (0.014) 
-1.208 
(0.019) 
-1.207 
(0.019) 
-1.067 
(0.019) 
-1.092 
(0.019) 
-1.035 
(0.019) 
Faculty  -0.001 (0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
Public Univ.   -0.015 (0.000) 
0.145 
(0.003) 
0.111 
(0.002) 
0.136 
(0.003) 
Gov’t R&D    -0.175 (0.003)   
Private R&D    -0.019 (0.000)   
Local R&D    -0.004 (0.000)   
Total R&D     -0.177 (0.003)  
Total Financial Support      -0.305 (0.006) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are 1,000 bootstrap standard errors. 
  
effects of the TTO policy by support type. As discussed in Section II, the financial 
support program for TTOs was implemented and aimed at two groups: leader 
groups and consortia. As indicated by the policy name, this policy was designed for 
leading TTOs, but it also provided an opportunity for the remaining TTOs for 
which the performance levels were second-best. Support for this non-leader group 
was provided in the form of a consortium, and eight universities were selected for 
the program. From Panel (a), the marginal effects of both types are skewed towards 
the larger side, which means that most of the TTOs have small marginal effects, 
and only a few TTOs enjoy relative greater improvements in efficiency by the 
policy. The horizontal line in the box plot represents the median of the distribution. 
We can find that the median of the leader group is higher than that of the 
consortium, which demonstrates that the marginal improvement of efficiency in the 
consortium is greater when TTOs are supported by the financial support policy. 
Note that the variance of the marginal effects in the leader group is smaller than 
that in the consortium. This provides a rationale for the need to investigate how the 
effects of the policy differ with the characteristics of each university. 
Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows the marginal effects of faculty size. We categorize 
faculty size into 100 units, and the largest category is the group of universities with 
more than 1800 faculty members. The results show that the marginal effects of 
faculty size are positive but non-monotonic. In particular, smaller universities are 
more likely to have a greater efficiency improvement than larger universities when 
the faculty size increases.  
Figure 2 displays the marginal effects of different type of funding on TTOs’ 
technical efficiency levels, as estimated in specifications (5) – (7). The tendencies 
of the three panels are similar, as the three funding types are highly correlated. The 
leader group is indicated by the blue squares, the consortium is shown by the red 
triangles, and unsupported TTOs are denoted by the gray crosses. Mostly, the leader 
group tends to be larger in terms of how much funding they receive. Notably, a 
larger amount of funding received means a smaller marginal effect. Overall, the 
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(a) SUPPORT TYPE (b) FACULTY SIZE 
FIGURE 1. MARGINAL EFFECTS OF THE SUPPORT TYPE AND 
FACULTY SIZE ON THE INEFFICIENCY DISTRIBUTION 
Note: The horizontal axis represents the determinant and the vertical axis is the marginal effect. The horizontal line 
in the box-whisker plot is the median and the dots are outliers. In panel (b), the unit of faculty size (horizontal 
axis) is one hundred and 18+ indicates a faculty size of more than 1,800 professors. 
 
 
(a) GOV’T R&D FUNDING (b) TOTAL R&D FUNDING 
 
(c) Total Financial Support 
FIGURE 2. MARGINAL EFFECTS OF R&D FUNDING AND 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT ON THE INEFFICIENCY DISTRIBUTION 
Note: The observation-wise marginal effects of government R&D funding, total R&D funding, and total financial 
support are estimated in specifications (5), (6), and (7), respectively. 
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relationship between the marginal effects of funding and the funding size is 
positive and concave. However, the magnitude and variation in the marginal effects 
are much larger among unsupported TTOs. 
In sum, the results imply that the marginal effects of efficiency determinants are 
non-monotonic and increase as the research capacity of the affiliate university 
becomes smaller. Interestingly, the marginal effect of the TTO support policy is 
greater for TTOs supported in the consortium group. Taken together, the marginal 
effect of the TTO policy on mitigating inefficiency was greater for TTOs whose 
universities have less research funding and lower capacities. This result is 
somewhat out of line with the intent of the policy. We expect larger marginal 
effects for the leader group because the goal of the policy was to assist with the 
growth of TTOs which had shown better performance by supporting their operating 
and personnel expenses. The deviating policy effect is due to the uniform policy 
enforcement, which does not take into account the various characteristics of each 
university and/or TTO. Moreover, although many TTOs complain about 
difficulties due to a lack of professional manpower, there appears to be no 
relationship between the marginal effect of this policy and TTO employment. This 
implies that a policy that only supports personnel and business expenses does not 
solve the fundamental problem of TTO expert deficiency. 
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates technical efficiency scores against royalty income in 
2011 and 2015. The technical efficiency score can be derived from the estimated 
inefficiency, ˆitu , via ˆexp( | )it itu  . In this figure, we can observe the change of  
 
 
FIGURE 3. TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY VERSUS ROYALTY INCOME IN 2011 AND 2015   
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each of the TTO’s positions. Royalty income is a measure for the final output of 
the TTO, whereas technical efficiency is a measure showing how efficiently it has 
operated through the ratio of input to output. As the TTO policy started in 2011 and 
ended in 2015, it is possible to check whether it has induced only external growth 
of the final output or caused an actual capacity enhancement of productivity or 
efficiency. In Figure 3, the vertical and horizontal lines for each panel are the 
averages of royalty income and technical efficiency, respectively. Although the 
average of royalty income did not change much, the average technical efficiency 
was improved. The efficiency level of the leader group has improved overall, while 
the variance in output (royalty income) was smaller. The efficiency of TTOs that 
were below the average efficiency score in 2011, in this case #14 and #29, was 
greatly improved in 2015. 11  In contrast, it is difficult to find a systematic 
difference between 2011 and 2015 for the consortium group. The plot shows that 
the relative efficiency of TTOs in the consortium group was exacerbated, or at least 
was not improved. Interestingly, the unsupported group improved in terms of both 
outcome and efficiency. 
 
D. Additional Empirical Analysis 
 
More technology transfer contracts and greater amounts of royalty income are 
commonly the major objectives of TTOs, but each TTO may assign different 
weights to these goals depending on the strategies they employ. TTOs with high-
value technologies may try to focus on transferring technologies at higher prices. 
On the other hand, we can conjecture that the majority of TTOs may try to increase 
their overall revenue by signing more contracts. Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of the 
number of technology transfers contracts against royalty income. The two variables 
are positively correlated12 but the data points are more dispersed with an increase 
in either the number of contracts or royalty income. This reflects the possibility that 
the behavior of the TTO becomes diversified as the TTO’s capacity increases. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to estimate our model with the number of technology 
transfers contracts as the dependent variable.  
Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates and Table 6 provides the associated 
marginal effects of the inefficiency determinants. We compare the results with the 
estimates in Section III-C. Regarding the estimation of the Frontier Equation, the 
coefficients of TTO employment and domestic patents are estimated to be similar 
to the previous results. However, the sign of the foreign patent coefficient is 
estimated to be negative and significant. This is an interesting result in that it 
implies that when more foreign patents are owned, fewer technology transfers 
occur. This may be in line with our conjecture that TTOs with potentially high-
value technologies may seek to focus on raising the value of their technology rather 
than on the quantity of their contracts. 
The most noticeable difference between the inefficiency equation estimation 
results shown in Table 5 against Table 3 is that the magnitude of the overall coefficient 
 
11TTO #29 was excluded from the support list starting in 2013. 
12The correlation coefficient between the number of technology transfer contracts and royalty income in our 
sample is only about 0.68. 
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FIGURE 4. CORRELATION BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS AND ROYALTY INCOME 
 
estimates is reduced. In addition, the signs of the public university dummy become 
negative and the standard errors shrink, even if we cannot reject from 
specifications (A5) – (A7), showing that R&D funding does not have significant 
effects on the inefficiency distribution, whereas an increase in total financial 
support helps reduce the inefficiency of TTOs. The marginal effects of the 
inefficiency determinants are also estimated to be comparable with slightly 
decreased magnitudes, as displayed in Table 6.  
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TABLE 5—PARAMETER ESTIMATES WITH THE NUMBER OF TECH. TRANSFER CONTRACTS  
Dep. Var. Number of Tech. Transfer Contracts (logged) 
Specifications (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) 
Frontier Equation 
Operating Expenses -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.017 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) 
TTO employment 0.324*** 0.259*** 0.239*** 0.236*** 0.224*** 0.232*** 0.215*** 
 (0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067) 
Domestic Patents 0.494*** 0.478*** 0.407*** 0.377*** 0.395*** 0.365*** 0.316*** 
 (0.051) (0.047) (0.052) (0.054) (0.060) (0.057) (0.058) 
Foreign Patents -0.077** -0.109*** -0.103*** -0.085** -0.096** -0.084** -0.073** 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.035) (0.034) 
Constant 0.896** 1.097*** 1.716*** 1.864*** 1.979*** 1.942*** 2.204*** 
 (0.395) (0.413) (0.321) (0.325) (0.314) (0.316) (0.299) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inefficiency Equation 
Mu        
TTO Policy (t-1)  -4.908** -2.015** -1.775** -1.518** -1.589** -0.963* 
  (2.106) (0.902) (0.777) (0.726) (0.763) (0.539) 
Faculty   -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Public Univ.    -0.515* -0.294 -0.423 -0.196 
    (0.310) (0.306) (0.309) (0.239) 
Gov’t R&D      -0.155   
     (0.163)   
Private R&D     -0.049   
     (0.100)   
Local R&D     -0.028   
     (0.100)   
Total R&D      -0.117  
      (0.134)  
Total Financial 
Support 
      -0.460*** 
      (0.125) 
Constant -1.821 -0.952 1.496*** 2.220*** 5.278*** 3.940** 9.292*** 
 (1.638) (1.034) (0.402) (0.507) (1.791) (1.981) (1.921) 
Usigma        
Constant 0.836* 0.748** 0.292 0.260 0.158 0.215 -0.006 
 (0.449) (0.307) (0.193) (0.182) (0.179) (0.183) (0.143) 
Vsigma        
Constant -1.557*** -1.780*** -2.259*** -2.352*** -2.394*** -2.431*** -2.783*** 
 (0.180) (0.186) (0.284) (0.311) (0.291) (0.348) (0.528) 
Obs. 738 738 738 738 711 738 725 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -841.70 -823.50 -790.76 -786.92 -750.33 -785.82 -755.04 
Note: 1) Numbers in parentheses are Huber-White Robust Standard Errors, 2) *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
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TABLE 6—MARGINAL EFFECTS OF THE INEFFICIENCY DETERMINANTS 
ON THE NUMBER OF TRANSFER CONTRACTS 
Specifications (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) 
TTO Policy (t-1) -1.084 (0.010) 
-0.825 
(0.011) 
-0.767 
(0.010) 
-0.706 
(0.011) 
-0.731 
(0.010) 
-0.554 
(0.019) 
Faculty  -0.001 (0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
Public Univ.   -0.223 (0.003) 
-0.137 
(0.002) 
-0.195 
(0.003) 
-0.113 
(0.002) 
Gov’t R&D    -0.072 (0.001)   
Private R&D    -0.023 (0.000)   
Local R&D    -0.013 (0.000)   
Total R&D     -0.054 (0.001)  
Total Financial Support      -0.264 (0.004) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are 1,000 bootstrap standard errors. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
  
Korea's R&D investment is steadily increasing, along with the share of 
government and public resources. In the early 2000s, the Korean government 
began to recognize the importance of technology transfers and put forward policies 
to promote them. The Leading TTO Cultivation Project is one of these technology 
transfer promotion policies, which is relevant in that it directly supports technology 
transfer intermediaries. This policy has had a positive effect in that TTOs and 
related experts at universities have expanded quantitatively and the interest in 
technology transfers has increased. 
This study empirically analyzed the effects of exogenous variations, in this case 
the research capacity, amounts of funding and financial aid, and the university 
type, as well as policy interventions, on the operational efficiency of TTOs. We use 
a production function approach, in particular a stochastic frontier analysis, to 
estimate the efficiency scores for each TTO and the marginal effects of exogenous 
variables. Our empirical results suggest that the smaller the research capacity and 
the amount of financial aid for the university to which the TTO belongs, the larger 
the marginal effects of exogenous variables. More importantly, the marginal effect 
of the Leading TTO Cultivation Project was not monotonic and was greater for the 
TTO group which was supported as a type of consortium than for the leader group. 
The policy originally aimed to support TTOs which showed excellent performance 
initially, followed by help for the growth of late-runner TTOs. Our results imply 
that the policy goal is not fully achieved in that the effects on the target group did 
not outperform the effects on the other group. Nevertheless, the implementation of 
the project helped to reduce inefficiency on average. This result is unchanged when 
we estimate the model with the number of technology transfer contracts as a 
dependent variable. 
Therefore, we conclude that the policy may have been more effective if a 
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detailed policy design had been provided considering the different conditions of 
TTOs. If more subsidies are provided to late-runners and non-monetary support 
such as technology promotions and the easing of legal constraints could be 
provided to the front-runners, the policy effect may be maximized. In addition, the 
policy effect can be maximized if different policy devices are implemented 
considering each university's research capacity, financial environment, and the 
characteristics of the TTOs. 
As noted above, there are more policies for the purpose of vitalizing industry-
university cooperation and the growth of TTOs than the Leading TTO Cultivation 
Project analyzed in this study. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the 
government policy is too monotonous based solely on the analysis conducted here. 
Nevertheless, this study has significance in that it quantitatively assessed the 
effectiveness of the TTO operating-cost support policy and pointed out that this 
policy could be further improved. 
In addition, it is important to point out that the direction of the government's 
TTO support policy must be clearly defined. The Leading TTO Cultivation Project 
aims to support TTOs already equipped with technology transfer capabilities to 
reach a higher level of TTO. However, as shown in this study, the policy effects 
associated with efficiency improvements were greater in the second-tier group than 
in the leader group and were larger in relatively small colleges  and in those that 
lack capacity. This confirms that there is a gap between the current policy goals and 
the means by which to realize them. If the government wants to maintain its current 
goal of increasing the growth of leading TTOs, the size of the subsidy should be 
increased to match the size and capacity of the school. However, if the government 
wants gradually to reduce support for leading TTOs and enhance support for 
latecomer TTOs, the current criteria for the selection of support colleges should be 
changed. 
Finally, it should be noted that the analysis in this paper does not consider the 
production of research outcomes. In other words, even when the research 
production performance of a school is poor and the outcome is not continuously 
produced, the school is classified as highly efficient if the technology transfer 
performance against input is excellent. This case was not addressed separately, but 
the desirable policy direction for such cases would be to secure the mobility of 
skilled technical transfer personnel to other schools and to provide support for 
research capacity improvements of such colleges. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1—CORRELATION MATRIX 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
[1] 1.000            
[2] 0.678 1.000 .          
[3] 0.445 0.515 1.000          
[4] 0.584 0.567 0.432 1.000         
[5] 0.679 0.742 0.411 0.495 1.000        
[6] 0.631 0.776 0.469 0.520 0.920 1.000       
[7] 0.669 0.695 0.462 0.812 0.766 0.808 1.000      
[8] 0.702 0.787 0.488 0.815 0.809 0.832 0.870 1.000     
[9] 0.756 0.818 0.435 0.550 0.868 0.803 0.710 0.834 1.000    
[10] 0.505 0.732 0.368 0.282 0.818 0.836 0.554 0.684 0.836 1.000   
[11] 0.437 0.611 0.393 0.368 0.625 0.754 0.576 0.625 0.533 0.604 1.000  
[12] 0.657 0.810 0.493 0.553 0.915 0.990 0.825 0.865 0.835 0.850 0.733 1.000 
Note: [1]: No. of technology transfers, [2]: royalty income, [3]: No. of TTO staff members, [4]: operational 
expenses, [5]: government research funding, [6]: total research funding, [7]: total financial support, [8]: No. of 
students, [9]: No. of faculty members, [10]: total education expenses, [11]: domestic patents granted, [12]: foreign 
patents granted. 
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